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1 Introduction 
The performance of a political or economic institution depends critically upon its ability 
to structure micro-level incentives to be in agreement with macro-level goals (Schelling, 
1978). In many important situations, micro-level incentives are consistent with multiple 
equilibria (Axelrod and Bennet, 1993; DeVany, 1994), and one role of institutions may 
be to steer agents towards the best configuration, or at least bias outcomes towards 
better configurations. In this paper, we compare the performance of various political 
institutions in a model of Tiebout competition. We examine whether some political 
institutions induce better sorting of citizens among competing jurisdictions, leading to 
configurations of higher aggregate utility. 1 
In a Tiebout model, local jurisdictions compete for citizens using bundles of public 
goods. Citizens then sort themselves among jurisdictions according to their preferences. 
Tiebout's (1956) original formulation challenged Samuelson's (1954) conjecture that pub­
lic goods could not be allocated efficiently. The original "Tiebout hypothesis" has since 
been extended to include additional propositions. Prominent among them is that Tiebout 
competition, as a result of enforcing efficiency, renders local politics unimportant: a po­
litical institution able to attract and retain citizens cannot waste resources, i.e. , it must 
be efficient (Hoyt, 1990). This argument does not preclude the possibility that political 
institutions may differ in their ability to sort citizens according to preferences, which is 
the focus of this paper. 
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1Given that Tiebout models assume sorting with respect to preferences over public goods and services, 
the perspective of this paper is that configurations with greater homogeneity of preferences within 
districts create higher utility, which would not be the case if sorting occurs along racial or cultural 
dimensions then (Schelling 1978). 
To investigate this question, we construct a computational Tiebout model. Under a 
variety of conditions and parameters in the model, significant differences arise in the per­
formance of distinct political institutions. In the model, citizens confront a finite number 
of local public issues, which may be considered as either local public projects or local 
policies. Citizens have linearly separable preferences over these local public issues, and 
they choose to locate in the jurisdiction offering the most attractive array of decisions 
on the issues. Within this skeletal framework we compare the abilities of various polit­
ical institutions to aggregate preferences and to sort citizens. Among the institutions 
considered are referenda, two-party competition, and multiple party competition under 
a variety of voting rules. Iri most respects, the findings agree with standard Tiebout 
models. We find, for instance, that both aggregate utility and the amount of movement 
between jurisdictions increase with the number of jurisdictions. We also find, rather 
unexpectedly, that institutions which perform poorly in a model with one jurisdiction 
perform well when there are multiple jurisdictions with migrating citizens. Political in­
stitutions not yielding a unique policy prediction, but whose policies sometimes cycle, 
appear to induce more sorting than institutions which yield unique policy predictions. 
As a result, institutions with policy cycles might generate better configurations of citi­
zens' locations. We offer an explanation for this phenomenon based on insights from the 
literature on nonlinear search algorithms. The analysis suggests that in order for "polit­
ical instability" to improve outcomes in a multi-jurisdiction environment, the degree of 
instability must be positively correlated with the heterogeneity of citizens' preferences. 
Later in the paper we construct measures of instability and heterogeneity of preferences , 
and find that three of the institutions we consider, two-party competition, Borda rule, 
and proportional representation, exhibit positive correlations between the two measures. 
The remainder of the paper consists of five sections. In section 2, we briefly survey 
the empirical and theoretical literature on Tiebout's theory, and relate past research to 
the research presented here. The next two sections contain a description of the model 
and an informal explanation of the tradeoff between local political stability and global 
efficiency. In section 5, we describe our computational findings, emphasizing the relative 
performances of various political institutions. The final section contains directions for 
future work. 
2 The Tiebout Hypothesis 
This section summarizes several important papers since the original Tiebout formulation 
and indicates how this paper departs from previous research. Tiebout's hypothesis has 
been investigated in depth both theoretically and empirically.2 The theoretical litera­
ture has uncovered flaws in Tiebout's argument, and many theorists, notably Bewley 
(1981), have clarified and extended Tiebout's original model. Bewley's characterization 
of a Tiebout Equilibrium (TE) consists of five conditions. First, each agent maximizes 
her utility subject to a budget constraint. Second, each agent inhabits the region she 
2See Dowding, John, and Biggs (1994) for a recent survey. 
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most prefers. Third, each firm maximizes its profits. Fourth, regional governments have 
balanced budgets. Fifth, each regional government's choice of tax schedule and bun­
dle of public goods is consistent with its preferences. Bewley considers two types of 
governments: democratic governments which maximize the welfare of their citizens and 
entrepreneurial governments, which have objectives, such as maximizing their local pop­
ulation, that are independent of the preferences of their citizens. For the purposes of this 
paper, the former type of government is more relevant. Bewley shows through a series of 
examples that regardless of whether the local public goods' costs are independent of the 
size of the local population or proportional to the size of the local population, there exist 
economies with TE which are not Pareto optimal. In other words, the Tiebout hypothesis 
does not hold. The existence of examples with suboptimal TE by itself is not sufficient 
to dispose with Tiebout's theory. More troubling is Bewley's result that the Tiebout 
hypothesis can be expected to hold only when the number of jurisdictions is at least 
as large as the number of citizens-a rather unlikely situation. Subsequent to Bewley's 
analysis, theorists have attempted to resurrect the Tiebout hypothesis, by relaxing his 
assumptions or including frictions in the relocation decisions. Among the assumptions of 
Bewley's simplified model are that agents have perfect, costless mobility, and that there 
are no external effects between agents and regions. Recently, economists have begun to 
pay attention to the importance of these external relationships (Durlauf, 1994), which 
may be relevant to the findings presented in this paper.3 Nevertheless, we know of no 
formal theoretical research comparing the performance of qualitatively different political 
institutions in a Tiebout setting. 
The empirical literature on Tiebout focuses on three questions: Does competition 
among jurisdictions lead to efficiency? Do bundles of local public goods enter into juris­
dictional choice? How do various political institutions influence the provision of public 
goods? Tests of the first question belong to a larger literature on the size of govern­
ment, commonly referred to as the Leviathan Literature. If, following Tullock (1965) and 
Niskanen, (1971 ), politicians are budget maximizing bureaucrats, then in the absence of 
competition, government budgets would grow too large. Attempts to test this theory 
and, implicitly, the Tiebout hypothesis, have taken many forms. Typically, these empiri­
cal models regress the size of government on the number of competing local jurisdictions. 
A negative relationship would support the Tiebout hypothesis that competition leads to 
greater efficiency. Unfortunately, empirical findings are inconclusive at best and appear 
to depend upon whether the local jurisdictions are single or multi-purpose (Zax, 1989).4 
Tests that bundles of public goods enter into jurisdictional choice fall into two categories: 
macro-level and micro-level studies. In a number of cases using aggregate data, fiscal 
differences among jurisdictions have been shown to have a significant effect on migration 
(Reschovsky, 1979). 5  These studies find that fiscal factors play a larger role in pushing 
3A related literature examines the growth and development of cities (Arthur, 1989; Krugman, 1991). 
The work of Jacobs (1984) has been a driving force behind these models. 
4Zax shows that the lowest levels of tax appeared to be paid when there is high fragmentation 
among multi-purpose j urisdictions, low fragmentation of single purpose districts, and decentralized 
governments. We use the word appear because the widespread existence of special districts to exploit 
returns to scale makes clean tests difficult. 
5Cebula (1974) has shown that welfare payments had a significant effect on interstate migration in 
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people out of districts than in pulling people into new districts, which is not surprising 
given the informational asymmetry (Fox, Herzog, Schbottman, 1989). Other studies rely 
on micro-level survey data to examine the link between public services and goods, and 
jurisdictional choice. The findings in the micro-level studies are less conclusive, although 
school quality and tax rates appear as significant in several studies (Sharp, 1 984; Percy 
and Hawkins, 1992; Percy, 1993). Finally, welfare policies across states in the U.S. do 
seem to influence migration patterns of the poor (Peterson and Rom, 1989). 
The third and final question is most relevant for our purposes. There have been few 
empirical studies of the effects of political institutions on the provision of public goods. 
A notable exception is a paper by Romer and Rosenthal (1979) on school spending 
referenda. They find that the reversion level (what policy will be if the referenda fails) 
influences the outcomes of referenda. As a result of the meager literature in this area, 
we have little guidance from past work on parameter values. Thus, in what follows we 
are careful to test our model under a wide variety of conditions. 
Our model departs from previous theoretical approaches in several important respects. 
First , with a few exceptions, our primary interest, comparing the performance of political 
institutions, has been neglected to a large extent in the Tiebout literature. A typical 
Tiebout model takes the political institution, usually majority rule, as exogenous and 
constant. Here we vary institutions and measure performance, an approach consistent 
with the literature on mechanism design. Second, aside from an analysis of an extended 
example, we do not compare equilibria. This decision stems partly from a desire to avoid 
oversimplifying an already stark model by making the restrictive assumptions necessary 
to guarantee the existence of equilibria. Also, our theoretical approach emphasizes the 
dynamic nature of population migration, political responsiveness, and the production of 
public goods. People may continue relocating in response to changing policies, while 
local policies react, in turn, to changes in constituencies. The system of policy choices by 
governments and jurisdictional choices by citizens can be viewed as a complex adaptive 
system in which movements and policies are determined by the preference of citizens 
and the political institution. Some institutions may create complex systems which settle 
quickly into equilibria while others may create systems which never equilibrate.6 Third, 
our assumptions of how organizations make decisions differ from much of the previous 
literature in political science. Rather than model political parties as fully informed and 
optimizing, we rely on an adaptive party model in which parties gather information by 
taking polls and make decisions on the local public issues using heuristics (Kollman, 
Miller, and Page, 1992) . The adaptive party model will be described in more detail in 
the next section. 
the U.S. from 1965-1970. 
60ne may also argue that local populations never completely stabilize in reality. Arguably, these 
movements may be part of a drift towards an equilibrium, but if the equilibrium point changes before 
the population can locate the previous equilibrium, restricting attention to equilibrium phenomena may 
be misleading. 
4 
3 The Model 
Presentation of the model is divided into three parts. We begin by characterizing prefer­
ences. We next describe an adaptive party model and conclude with descriptions of the 
political institutions under consideration. 
3.1 Preferences 
We assume that there are a agents, k jurisdictions, and n binary variables, which we call 
local public issues (LPis) upon which each local government is obliged to make a decision. 
Def'n: The set of agents A =  {1 ,  .. , a}. 
Def'n: The set of jurisdictions]{ =  {1 , .. , k }. 
Def'n: The set of local public issues N = {1 ,  . . , n }. 
A configuration is a mapping of agents to jurisdictions. 
Def'n: A configuration r : A -+ K. 
To distinguish between issues and decisions made on issues, we refer to the latter as 
local public decisions (LPDs) and to a set of decisions on all n issues as a local public 
decision array (LPDA). 
Def 'n: A local public decision at location j on issue C is dje E { N, Y}. 
Def'n: A local public decision array at location j is dj E {N, Y}n. 
The set of all local public decision arrays will be called a global public decision array 
(GPDA). As mentioned, a LPI may concern funding a public project such as a beach,7 
7In this case; a LPD of Y might denote that the beaches are staffed and cleaned for the summer. 
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or alternatively, a LPI may pertain to a local policy on an issue, for example, public 
smoking laws. We assume that agents have linearly separable preferences on LPis and 
that their per unit value for each LPI lies in the interval [-�, �] distributed uniformly.
Def'n: Agent i's per unit utility on issue f, aie E [-�, �] distributed uniformly.
An agent's utility from an LPDA equals the sum of her values on the LPDs. 
n 
Def'n: Agent i's utility from LPDA dj, ui( dj) Laie · 8(dje), where 8(Y) 1 and
f.=1 
8(N) = 0.
A straightforward calculation verifies that the expected value to an agent of an arbi­
trary bundle of projects equals zero and the expected value to an agent of her optimal 
bundle equals one. 
· 
3 .2 Adaptive Parties 
Comparing the performance of political institutions in a formal model poses several 
difficulties, not least among them is determining electoral outcomes when theories do 
not arrive at unique predictions. To overcome this problem, we borrow Kollman, Miller, 
and Page's (1992) adaptive party model in which parties adapt platforms using search 
heuristics applied to polling information. We then average over many sample elections 
in order to make comparisons across institutions. 
Our modeling of parties as incrementally adaptive and reliant on incomplete informa­
tion contrasts with the rational choice approach in which parties either have complete 
information or act as Bayesians. l,From our perspective, no single model of party be­
havior is likely to be accurate. Computational modeling provides us the flexibility to 
consider various models of party behavior and to learn which findings are particular 
to the assumed party behavior and which are generic. Practical considerations impose 
restrictions on the amount and type of information available to parties, on parties' com­
putational abilities, and on the maximum allowable policy change in any one election. 
For example, we assume that in order to maintain both credibility and a coherent orga­
nization, parties can make only minor alterations in their LPDA in any one time period. 
We further assume that the parties rely exclusively on polling data as opposed to having 
direct knowledge of the utility functions of agents. 
Computational constraints limit the actual number of behavioral rules we consider. In 
the computational experiments performed for this paper, we test three types of adaptive 
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search rules for parties. These are random search, genetic algorithms (Holland, 1975), 
and directed search techniques. Our findings to date suggest that few implications depend 
significantly on the heuristic used by parties, provided the parties are neither omniscient 
nor dim witted. 
The findings presented in section 5 of this paper include only a multi-step hill climbing 
heuristic, which can be described as follows: prior to the first election, a random initial 
platform LPDA is assigned to each party. In subsequent elections, parties begin with their 
LPDA from the previous election. Parties alternate adapting their LPDAs in an attempt 
to increase their vote totals. Suppose that a party's initial LPDA is given by y*. The 
algorithm has two steps. First, a new LPDA y1 is randomly created in a neighborhood 
of y*.8 If the new LPDA yields a higher vote total, y1 becomes the party's LPDA. This 
process continues for a few iterations and then another party adapts. After each party 
has adapted several times, an election is held. 
3.3 The Institutions 
We model four political institutions: democratic referenda) two-party competition) pro­
portional representation) and Borda rule. These labels only imply that we have cre­
ated abstract models of the corresponding real world institutions. In order to formulate 
tractable representations of actual institutions, we have resorted to strong assumptions, 
and our approximations are crude at best. We have sought, however, to capture as many 
relevant aspects of each institution as possible without overly complicating the analysis. 
3.3.1 Democratic Referenda (DR) 
We model democratic referenda as majority rule on each LPL 9 The assumption that 
there are no external effects between projects implies that sincere voting is a dominant 
strategy for all agents. The outcome of democratic referenda is the median LPDA at 
each jurisdiction, which is defined as follows: 
Def'n: The median LPDA at j given r, dj(I'):
dje= Y if j {i : f(i)=j and aic > O}I > l{i:f(i)=jandaic<O}I 
dje = N otherwise. 
8In our formulation, a neighborhood of a LPDA y consists of all LPDAs whose Hamming distance 
from y is less than or equal to three. Formally N(y) = {y : d(y, y) :S 3 }. 
9In the case of a tie, we assume that the LPD equals N. 
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The LPDA dj maximizes utility at jurisdiction j given r if and only if on every 
issue the mean agent value and the median agent value have identical signs. Generally 
speaking, democratic referenda locates a policy of relatively high aggregate utility given a 
configuration. In addition, democratic referenda is relatively stable: the policy prediction 
is unique and an individual agent migrating into or out of a jurisdiction rarely changes 
the median LPDA. Suppose that a single agent moving into a jurisdiction has a positive 
value on issue one. The only way that she can change the LPD on issue one is if, prior 
to her moving, an equal number of agents had positive and negative per unit values on 
that issue. 
3.3.2 Two-Party Competition 
We model two-party competition as competition among political parties advocating LP­
DAs. Each agent votes for the party proposing the LPDA which yields her higher utility. 
Two-Party competition is not as stable as democratic referenda, which produces a unique 
outcome equal to the median voter's preference on each LPI. Even with the linearly sep­
arable preferences considered here, there need not be a Condorcet winner. Policy pre­
dictions cannot be guaranteed to be a unique without severe. restrictions on preferences 
(Plott, 1967). This has led theorists to try to formalize the equilibrium set for two-party 
competition. The top-cycle set (McKelvey, 1976), the uncovered set (McKelvey, 1986), 
and the minmax set (Kramer, 1977), are among the proposed solution sets. The absence 
of a unique equilibrium in two-party competition for large classes of preferences calls 
into question the effectiveness of democratic decision making (Bates, 1990). 
Def'n: A LPDA dj belongs to the top cycle set at jurisdiction j if for any platform dj 
which defeats dj, there exists a sequence of LPDAs { di}�1 such that dj defeats di, di 
defeats Ji+l for all i and Jm defeats dj. 
Claim 3 . 1  states that our assumptions about the utility functions of agents imply that 
the top cycle set contains the median platform dj at each jurisdiction. 
Claim 3.1 At each jurisdiction, dj belongs to the top cycle set. 
pf: Let I dj - dj I = I { f : djc '/:- djc} I equal the Hamming distance between two LPDAs.
Choose dj in the top cycle set at jurisdiction j. Let p =I dj - dj J. If p = 0, then the
proof is complete. Choose (L for i = 1 top such that I dj - di_I = i, I Ji� Ji+l I= 1 _forall i, and � = dj. A simple calculation shows that dj defeats d1 and that di defeats di+1 
for i less than p, which completes the proof. 
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In the next section, we will rely on the fact that the median LPDA array belongs to 
the top cycle set. It need not belong to the uncovered set, a refinement of the top cycle 
set. 
Def'n: A LPDA dj belongs to the uncovered set at jurisdiction j if there does not exist 
a LPDA d such that d defeats dj and also defeats any LPDA defeated by dj. 
In the following example, the median LPDA lies outside the uncovered set. 
Example: Suppose that there are three agents, a, b, and c, and three LPis. Define 
preferences as follows: 
Preferences 
Agent LPil LPI 2 LPI 3 
a +1 -0.4 -0.4 
b -0.4 +1 -0.4 
c -0.4 -0.4 +1 
The median LPDA given these preferences is NNN. However, NNN does not belong 
to the uncovered set. The LPDA YYY defeats NNN and also defeats YNN, NYN, and 
NNY, the three LPDAs defeated by NNN. 
This example demonstrates that predicting the LPDA resulting from two-party com­
petition depends critically upon the solution concept. The top cycle set encompasses the 
entire space, so it has no predictive value. The uncovered set can be shown to equal every 
LPDA except the median LPDA, which has an obvious focal advantage. Fortunately, for 
our purposes, predicting an exact LPDA is less important than knowing bounds on the 
set from which it will be chosen. As previously discussed, we rely on an adaptive party 
model in which parties with incomplete information choose LPDAs using heuristics, so 
none of these solution concepts corresponds exactly to the LPDAs our adaptive parties 
will implement. However, the general characteristics of each should roughly correspond 
to what our adaptive parties find. Consider two scenarios: In the first, agents' preferences 
are sufficiently homogeneous so that there is a Condorcet winner. In the second, not only 
is there no Condorcet winner, but the top cycle set and the uncovered set encompass the 
entire space, or nearly the entire space as in the above example. Evidence from compu­
tations described in section 5 suggests that in the first scenario, one or both of the two 
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adaptive parties will locate the Condorcet winner, while in the second scenario, the two 
parties will probably alternate in office. More importantly, they will advocate distinct 
LPDAs. 
3.3.3 Proportional Representation (PR) 
In our proportional representation (PR) system, each agent votes for one of several parties 
and each party receives a number of seats approximately proportional to their vote total. 
We assume no distortion between the percentage of the vote that a party receives and 
the percentage of seats it obtains in the legislature.10 Unlike two-party competition, 
no party need receive a majority of the vote. When there is no majority party, there 
must be a second stage process of deciding policies. In our formulation, once a party is 
allocated seats, it votes sincerely in a series of referenda among the parties on the LPis. 
The weight of a party's vote is equal to its percentage of the popular vote. So, if a party 
received 18% of the vote advocating the LPDA YNY, then that party would vote Y, N, 
and Y on the first, second, and third LPis respectively. These three votes each would 
be assigned a weight of 0.18. The LPD on an issue equals Y if the total weight of the 
parties advocating Y exceeds 0.5 and N otherwise.11 
In elections with more than two parties, an agent may have an incentive to vote 
strategically. Suppose that an agent preferred party a, advocating LPDA NNN to party 
b, advocating YYY. Suppose also that on the first LPI, that the agent prefers the LPD 
Y, and that the percentage of the vote won by parties advocating Y on the first LPI 
is approximately 0.5. If the percentage of the vote won by parties advocating N on the 
other two LPis is significantly greater than 0.5, then the agent may wish to vote for party 
b. Such examples notwithstanding, we assume that agents vote sincerely. We take up
the issue of strategic voting in the discussion at the end of the paper. 
There are two additional issues which we should address: the number of parties and 
parties' incentives. In many PR systems, a minimum percentage of votes is required 
in order to win any seats. This acts as a constraint on the number of parties. The 
formation of parties and the merging of existing parties are difficult to model. Therefore, 
the number of parties in our model is an exogenous parameter. We experiment with 
three, four, and seven parties. With respect to incentives, we assume that parties are 
only concerned with maximizing the percentage of the vote they receive. We leave for 
future work the situation in which parties have policy preferences. 
10There is a substantial literature on distortions between vote totals and legislative seat allocations. 
See Taagepera and Shugart (1989). 
11These assumptions do not preclude a party receiving a small percentage of the vote from having 
substantial power. 
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3.3.4 Borda Rule (BR) 
Under Borda rule, each agent ranks the parties in order of preference. An agent allocating 
votes tom parties, contributes m -1 votes to her favorite candidate, m -2 votes to her 
next favorite candidate, and decreases by one the number of votes to each succeeding 
candidate in order of preference so that the least preferred candidate receives no votes. 
Borda rule is similar to proportional representation in that the transitions from votes 
to seats and from seats to LPDAs require second stage decision processes. As in our 
model of PR, we assume that the proportion of seats is identical to the proportion of 
votes, and that LPDs are determined by weighted democratic referenda among the parties 
with weights determined by the number of seats. We also assume, as before, that parties 
are only interested in maximizing their percentage of the vote. 
4 Political Instability 
In this section, we discuss how political instability may permit greater sorting of citizens 
and therefore be beneficial in a model of Tiebout competition. The argument hinges 
on the relationship between the level of political instability within jurisdictions and the 
degree of homogeneity of preferences at each jurisdiction. At this point we should clarify 
that at present we do not have formal proofs for many of the ideas we put forth. What 
follows is an informal explanation of our results. The discussion borrows insights from 
recent research on condensed matter physics. Later in this paper, we present :findings 
from computational experiments that strongly support our explanation. Mathematical 
results may be possible, but our impressions to date are that any such results would be 
difficult to obtain even in a much simplified model. We believe, however, that the lack 
of sufficient mathematical tools should not preclude analysis. In fact, our computational 
model provides insights into how such proofs might proceed. 
4.1 Two Examples 
Two examples begin the discussion. The first example demonstrates how noise may im­
prove sorting in a Tiebout setting. The second example shows how the Tiebout equilibria 
with respect to two-party competition may be preferred to the Tiebout equilibria with 
respect to democratic referenda in a multiple jurisdiction model. 
4.1.1 Example: The Advantage of Noise 
In this simple example, there are two jurisdictions a and /3, ten agents, and one local 
public issue. Suppose that local public decisions are made using democratic referenda. 
To simplify notation, we identify agents by their preferred decision on the LPI in lower 
case letters. If agent 1 has a positive value on the LPI, she is denoted by y. Let a contain 
1 1  
five agents {y , y , y , n , n} and f3 also contain five agents {y,y,y,n,n}. The LPD in each 
jurisdiction equals Y. If agents do not consider the impact of their movements on policy, 
then no agent would want to relocate. 
Suppose that we introduce noise and relocate the two agents who both prefer n, from 
/3 to a. Now, the n's are in a majority in a. As a result, the three agents in a who prefer 
y will then move to (3. In this new configuration, each agent lives in a jurisdiction in 
which the LPD agrees with her preferred decision. Moreover, in this new configuration, 
if we were to randomly relocate any two agents, they would have no impact on the LPDs 
in either location, and they would immediately return to their original jurisdictions. 
Aggregate utility has increased. The point of this example is to show that there may be 
multiple equilibrium configurations, some of which are more stable then others. Noise 
may be able to improve aggregate utility by forcing a transition from one configuration 
to another one. 
4.1.2 Example: Improved Sorting 
A simple example demonstrates the tradeoff between local political stability and global 
efficiency. Prior to describing this example, we must clarify what we mean when we say 
that a configuration, r, is a Tiebout Equilibrium with respect to an institution. Given 
an institution, we first need a rule for the set of GPDAs which can result from each 
configuration. For democratic referenda, this rule consists of the median global public 
decision array. For two-party competition it might consist of all GPDA such that each 
LPDA belongs to either the top cycle set or the uncovered set in its jurisdiction. In 
the example below, the uncovered set and the top cycle set are identical for all relevant 
configurations of agents, so to simplify matters we will use the top cycle set as the rule 
for generating GPDAs. Thus, for the purposes of this example, a configuration r is a 
Tiebout Equilibrium with respect to two-party competition if for any GPDA, d,  dj lies in 
the top cycle set for all jurisdictions j given r, and no agent wants to relocate. 
In the example, there are two jurisdictions: a and /3, eight agents: a, b, c, d, e, J, g,
and h, and three LPis: 1, 2, and 3. Define preferences as follows: 
Preferences 
Agent LPI 1 LPI 2 LPI 3 
a +1 +1 +1 
b +1 - 1  +0.5 
c +1 +o.5 -1 
d +1 -1 -1  
e +1 -1 -1 
f -1 -0.5 -1 
g - 1  +0.5 -1 
h -1 +0.5 - 1  
12  
Assume the following configuration of agents to jurisdictions: a contains agents a, b, 
and c, and /3 contains agents d, e, f, g and h. If democratic referenda is the political 
institution, then the LPDA in a is YYY and in f3 the LPDA is NNN. It is easy to show 
that no agent wants to relocate. Therefore, the configuration of agents and the GPDA 
form a Tiebout Equilibrium with respect to democratic referenda. A simple calculation 
shows that the aggregate utility equals 4. We now show that two-party competition 
does not support this configuration of agents to jurisdictions as a Tiebout equilibrium. 
In two-party competition the LPDA YYY is not a Condorcet winner in a. The LPDA 
YNN defeats it by a vote of two to one.12 
One point of this example is to show that comparing the performance of institutions 
at a single jurisdiction in isolation may oversimplify the analysis, so prior to analyzing 
stability, we consider jurisdiction a in isolation. Democratic referenda would be preferred 
to two-party competition on utilitarian grounds. The sum of the utilities to agents a, b, 
and c from the LPDA YYY equals 4 while the sums of their utilities of the other LPDAs 
in the top cycle set YNN, YNY, and YYN equal 3, 3.5, and 3.5 respectively. If we assume 
for the moment that the LPDA resulting from two-party competition is randomly chosen 
from this set, then the lack of a unique outcome from two-party competition yields lower 
aggregate utility. 
With multiple jurisdictions, the lack of a unique outcome from two-party competition 
may induce sorting and increase aggregate utility. Including jurisdiction f3 in the analysis, 
we find that two-party competition does not support this configuration of agents as 
an equilibrium. More importantly, this configuration lies in the basin of attraction of 
an equilibrium configuration which has a higher aggregate utility. 13 First, notice that 
if the agents in a elect a candidate advocating a LPDA from the set {YYY, YYN, 
YNY}, they will not create a strict incentive for any agents from f3 to move to a. If, 
however, a candidate wins election in jurisdiction a advocating the platform YNN, then 
agents d and e strictly prefer jurisdiction a to jurisdiction f3, and they will relocate. 
Jurisdiction a would then contain agents a, b, c, d, and e and have a Condorcet winner, 
the LPDA YNN. Jurisdiction f3 would now contain agents f, g, and h and would have 
a new Condorcet winner, NYN. It is easy to show that this configuration of agents is 
a Tiebout Equilibrium with respect to two-party competition. By Claim 3. 1 it is also 
a Tiebout Equilibrium with respect to democratic referenda. More importantly, the 
aggregate utility of this configuration equals 5.5 which exceeds the aggregate utility of 4 
from the previous configuration 
12Incidentally, YNN is also not a Condorcet winner. It can be defeated by either YYN or YNY. These 
four LPD form the top cycle set, which in this case also equals the uncovered set. 
13By basin of attraction we mean the set of connected configurations that lead to higher aggregate 
utility than the status quo. 
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To summarize, two-party competition may result in the agents in jurisdiction a elect­
ing a candidate advocating a LPDA, YNN, which lowers their utility, but which encour­
ages agents to move into a. The new configuration of agents is a Tiebout Equilibrium 
with respect to both two-party competition and democratic referenda, and yields a higher 
aggregate utility. 
4.2 Insights from Simulated Annealing 
To develop intuition for our results, we apply insights from the literature on simulated 
annealing, a nonlinear optimization algorithm. Simulated annealing is a sequential search 
algorithm applied to a real valued function, f .  To apply simulated annealing, one must 
first create a neighborhood structure. Each point, x, in f's domain belongs to a neigh­
borhood, N ( x), which contains at least one point different from x. Simulated annealing 
works much like local hill climbing: at each step a new point in the neighborhood of 
the status quo point is tested and becomes the status quo point if it has a higher value 
under f .  Where simulated annealing differs from hill climbing is that it also accepts 
points which have lower values with some probability. This probability depends upon 
the difference in the function values, .6.(x,x) = f(x) - f(x}, and a temperature, T(t), 
which depends upon the time spent searching, t. Formally, if x is the status quo point 
and x is the lower valued tested point, the probability of acceptance is written: 
-L>(x,x) 
p(x, x, t) = e T(t) 
Notice that if the difference in function values, .6.( x, x ), is large relative to the tempera­
ture, T(t), then the probability of acceptance is low. The temperature can be interpreted 
as the degree of leniency. A high temperature allows for almost any new point to be ac­
cepted. A low temperature allows for a new point to be accepted only if the difference 
in function values is small. The temperature decreases to zero according to an annealing 
schedule. When the temperature nears zero, search converges to a local optimum with 
respect to the neighborhood structure attained. 
A substantial body of theory exists to explain the performance of simulated annealing. 
Hajek (198 4) has shown that given any function there exists an annealing schedule such 
that the simulated annealing procedure converges to the global optimum.14 To some ex­
tent these results are misleading. The proofs, whether relying on Markov chain theory or 
real analysis, require that every point be evaluated. This begs the question: why perform 
simulated annealing instead of exhaustive search? The primary reason is performance. 
In practice, simulated annealing has been very effective at locating good solutions with 
relatively few searches, even though it may often fail to locate global optima. 
14Similar results can be found in a special issue of Algorithmica (1991) Vol. 6, dedicated to simulated 
annealing. 
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A promising line of inquiry into the performance of simulated annealing considers 
the structure of local optima for the function being optimized. Given a neighborhood 
structure and a search algorithm, each local optimum has a basin of attraction. The 
larger a local optimum's basin of attraction, the more likely search ends at that local 
optimum. Simulated annealing performs better on functions with positive correlations 
between the values of local optima and the sizes of their basins of attraction. Local 
optima with small basins of attraction, and relatively low values, are more likely to be 
rendered unstable by the noise from the annealing schedule.15 In effect, the mistakes due 
to the temperature smooth over the smaller local optima, but are less likely to disturb 
local optima with large basins of attraction. Eventually, the optima with large basins of 
attraction become inescapable as the temperature tends to zero. Thus, the outcome of 
simulated annealing results in a distribution across those local optima with larger basins 
and relatively larger optima. 
In relating these insights to the performance of political institutions in a Tiebout 
model, we find strong, though not exact, connections. For explanatory purposes, we 
restrict the discussion to two political institutions: democratic referenda and two-party 
competition. In the previous section, we showed that democratic referenda yields a unique 
LPDA in each jurisdiction and that two-party competition qffers less stability. We can 
interpret this instability as making mistakes in that the LPDAs selected typically have 
lower utility than the median. We can consider a global public decision array (GPDA) 
together with the configuration of agents it generates as a point in the domain. A 
neighborhood of a point could consist of all GPDAs which lie within a fixed distance of one 
another (according to some metric) together with their corresponding re-configurations 
of agents. 
In order for a configuration of agents to be a Tiebout Equilibrium with respect to 
democratic referenda, no agent should want to relocate given the LPDA in her home 
jurisdiction. We know from Claim 3. 1 that at each jurisdiction the top cycle set contains 
the median LPDA chosen by democratic referenda. If adaptive parties choose LPDAs 
from a subset of the top cycle set (which includes the median platform), then a configu­
ration is less likely to be a Tiebout Equilibrium with respect to two-party competition 
than with respect to democratic referenda.16 The fact that there are fewer equilibrium 
configurations with respect to two-party competition in no way implies that they have 
higher average utility. To complete the argument, we must return to the structure of 
local optima. 
Simulated annealing locates good local optima because the mistakes bias search away 
from local optima with relatively low values and into local optima with relatively high 
values. This is more likely to occur when optima with low (high) values have small 
(large) basins of attraction. In such spaces, simulated annealing performs "as if" it can 
15Basins of attraction are determined by the neighborhood structure. The minimal basin of attraction 
consists only of those points in the neighborhood of a local optima. A large basin of attraction might 
consist of all neighbors of all neighbors of all neighbors of the neighborhood of a local optima. 
16Recall that in order to be a Tiebout Equilibrium with respect to an institution, no agent should 
want to relocate for any assignment of LPDAs from the sets of LPDAs in agreement with the institution. 
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recognize whether a local optima's value was relatively high or low, and escapes lower 
valued local optima. We propose that two-party competition performs similarly in a 
Tiebout model: two-party competition makes more (fewer) mistakes in relatively low 
(high) valued configurations enabling it to act 'as if' it recognizes the value of a local 
optima and to escape it (remain in it) if it has a low (high) value. 
Two characteristics of Tiebout competition generate this fortuitous bias in error mak­
ing. First, aggregate utility for a configuration of agents is positively correlated to the 
homogeneity of preferences at each jurisdiction. Second, more homogeneous preferences 
result in more stable outcomes from two-party competition.17 If, for example, an LPDA 
is a Condorcet winner, we would expect adaptive parties to locate it. Combining these 
two effects, if agents in a configuration are not very homogeneous at each jurisdiction, 
their aggregate utility will be low and two-party competition may tend to roam about 
the space of LPDAs rendering the configuration unstable. If the agents in a configuration 
are homogeneous at each jurisdiction, their aggregate utility will be high and two-party 
competition will select from a small set of LPDAs. This second configuration is more 
likely to be stable. Thus, among the stable configurations with respect to democratic 
referenda, those stable with respect to two-party competition should be biased towards 
configurations with higher aggregate utility. 
5 The Computational Model 
In this section, we describe findings from computational experiments on Tiebout compe­
tition. Computational findings can be particular to the parameter values selected, so we 
have endeavored to test many sets of parameter values. Results reported below appear to 
be robust to reasonable variations. F indings presented below using one-thousand agents 
should not be interpreted to mean that the computations involving two-hundred or ten­
thousand agents result in contradictory findings. The opposite is true, in fact. The 
particular parameter values chosen: one-thousand agents, eleven issues, and one, three, 
seven and eleven jurisdictions, are drawn from within a much larger set of parameters 
for which the results appear qualitatively similar.18 
This section begins with a description of the sequence of events and an explanation 
of the adaptive search rules used by parties. We then summarize findings from the 
one jurisdiction model and multiple jurisdiction models. Findings are included from 
experiments designed to test the explanation offered in section 4 on simulated annealing. 
We also relate preliminary findings from two extensions of the basic model. The first 
extension assumes a cost of relocation and the second assumes that agents exit the 
economy with a small probability and are replaced by randomly created agents. 
17 An aspect of this second characteristic has been addressed formally by McKelvey (1986) who showed 
that the size of the uncovered set decreases with the level of symmetry of preferences. 
18We have tried to balance the benefits of increasing the number of agents and costs in computation 
time of increasing the number of j urisdictions. In the future, we hope to complete more computations 
and to run more formal tests of robustness. 
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5.1 Sequence of Events 
The computational model begins with a procedure in which agents' preferences are cre­
ated and in which agents are assigned randomly to jurisdictions, with each agent being 
assigned to each jurisdiction with equal probability. We next begin a series of relocation 
decisions by agents and local public decisions by the political institutions until agents 
have had ten opportunities to relocate. For some political institutions, an equilibrium 
will have been attained at this point. Democratic referenda almost always settles into an 
equilibrium within four relocations for the parameter values used. The other institutions 
show no significant increases ·in aggregate utility after the first ten relocations. 
Following standard Tiebout models we assume that an agent moves to the jurisdiction 
providing her the highest utility.19 The choice of an LPDA by a political institutions can 
be relatively complicated for the institutions other than democratic referenda. Two­
party competition begins with two randomly created LPDAs each representing a party. 
The parties alternate adapting their LPDAs with the hopes of winning election. In the 
hill-climbing algorithm, which was used in the findings summarized below, a party was 
allowed five sets of eight platform adaptations. In each adaptation, the party tests a 
LPDA which differs from its status quo LPDA on at most thn�e of the eleven local public 
issues. If the new LPDA receives more votes, then it becomes the new status quo. At 
the completion of the eight LPDA adaptations, another party adapts. After each party 
has adapted five times, an election is held and the final LPDA is determined. 
For the multiple party models, the respective parties also alternate updating. Each 
party updates its random initial LPDA with the intent of maximizing its vote total. So 
that the comparisons would be meaningful, we allowed the same number of adaptations 
per party as in two-party competition. Thus, in the findings shown below, each had five 
opportunities to conduct eight platform adaptations using the exact same hill-climbing 
algorithm used in two-party competition. Although the algorithms for parties adapting 
in response to Borda rule and proportional representation are identical, adaptive party 
behavior differs under the two institutions because of how voters' preferences translate 
into vote totals. An adaptation which may result in more votes according to proportional 
representation, which only measures how many voters most prefer a party, may result in 
fewer votes than under Borda rule. 
5.2 Single Jurisdiction Findings 
For the most part, the findings in the single jurisdiction model are not surprising. For 
aggregate utility, democratic referenda performs best, followed by Borda rule, two-party 
competition, and proportional representation, in that order. 20 Democratic referenda 
19If two or more j urisdictions provide identical utility to an agent, the agent chooses the j urisdiction 
with the lower index unless her current j urisdiction provides maximal utility in which case she remains 
there. 
20In one case Borda outperforms democratic referenda. 
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produces an outcome of the median on each LPI, which produces nearly maximal utility 
given our assumptions on the distribution of preferences. The one unexpected finding 
is that Borda rule outperforms two-party competition and proportional representation 
regardless of the number of parties. In all three institutions involving parties, the resulting 
LPDAs are significantly better than randomly generated LPDAs. The characteristics of 
each institution differ considerably. In two-party competition, parties quickly adapt 
LPDAs of high aggregate utility. Once the parties have located a good region of LPDAs, 
they tend to wander within that region, alternating which party wins. Under both Borda 
rule and proportional representation, a party may benefit from appealing to a faction of 
voters and adapting an LPDA with low aggregate utility. This tendency to adapt less 
representative LPDAs would appear to undermine the performance of both institutions. 
Yet, given that the LPDA implemented usually does not belong to a single party but, 
instead, is decided upon by weighted majority rule, the unrepresentative LPDAs of the 
individual parties may combine to form a LPDA of high aggregate utility. 
The above discussion partially explains how Borda rule and proportional represen­
tation can result in LPDAs of relatively high aggregate utility. The question remains 
as to why Borda rule outperforms proportional representation in the single jurisdiction 
model. One reason may be that Borda rule promotes greater .stability than proportional 
representation. If a party makes a minor alteration in its LPDA under proportional 
representation, it may create a large enough shift in votes to change the LPDA result­
ing from weighted voting among the parties. Under Borda rule, a minor alteration in a 
party's LPDA may change its ranking for many people, but the effect on relative vote 
totals will not be very large. An additional reason Borda rule results in better outcomes 
is that under Borda rule parties care about how they are ranked, not just how many 
agents prefer them most, dampening their incentives to adapt LPDAs which appeal to a 
small fraction of the agents. 
Table 1 contains numerical findings from fifty trials of the single jurisdiction model 
with one-thousand agents and eleven LPis. We have normalized utilities so that the 
expected maximal utility to an agent equals one-hundred and the expected utility to an 
agent of a randomly selected platform equals zero. 21 
21 In the computations generating the findings shown, the adaptive parties used a multi-step hill­
climbing algorithm. Similar results obtain when parties used a random search algorithm or a genetic 
algorithm. 
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Table 1 
Single Jurisdiction: Utility 
Institution Agg. Utility (s.d.) 
Democratic Ref. 2.49 (1.60) 
Two-party Comp. 1.84 (1.74) 
Borda Rule (3 parties) 1 .92 (1.62) 
Borda Rule ( 4 parties) 2.45 (1. 78) 
Borda Rule (7 parties) 2.59 (1.67) 
Prop. Rep. (3 parties) 1.02 (1. 73) 
Prop. Rep. ( 4 parties) 1.05 (1.82) 
Prop. Rep. (7 parties) 1.29 (1.69) 
Both Borda rule and proportional representation improve significantly as the number 
of parties increases from three to seven. 22 With seven parties, Borda rule yields the 
highest aggregate utility of any political institution. Intuition for this finding is straight­
forward. As the number of parties increases, each agent has a party which advocates 
a LPDA near their utility maximizing LPDA. In the limit, as the number of parties 
equals the number of agents, these types of institutions become equivalent to democratic 
referenda. 
5.3 Multiple jurisdictions 
With multiple jurisdictions, agents can sort according to their preferences. Tiebout's 
theory predicts that aggregate utility will increase with the number of jurisdictions. We 
present findings from models with three, seven and eleven jurisdictions, and for all four 
institutions considered, aggregate utility increases with the number of jurisdictions. The 
increases from the one jurisdiction model to the three jurisdiction model are most dra­
matic. Also, the performance of the political institutions nearly reverses. Democratic 
referenda, which performed best in the one jurisdiction model, now yields the lowest ag­
gregate utility and proportional representation now performs second best. The disparity 
in performance appears to increase with the number of jurisdictions. 
22Note that here, and elsewhere, the terms in parentheses in the table are the standard errors of the 
distribution, not of the mean. 
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Table 2 
Multiple Jurisdictions: Utility 
Institution 3 Loc's (s.d.) 7 Loc's (s.d) 1 1  Loc's (s.d.) 
Democratic Ref. 34.40 (2.3 1) 48 .51  (2.04) 55.64 (2.05) 
Two-party Comp. 34.74 (1.8 3) 49.35 (1.74) 56.64 (1.96) 
Borda Rule ( 4 parties) 35.63 (1. 54) 52.05 (1.67) 59. 12  (1.55)
Prop. Rep. ( 4 parties) 35.53 (1.53) 5 1.41 (1.67) 58 . 5 1  (1.69) 
Earlier in the paper we described how, with multiple jurisdictions, two-party compe­
tition might outperform democratic referenda because it would induce more sorting of 
agents. Configurations of agents which had relatively low aggregate utility would be less 
likely to be stable with respect to two-party competition. A small policy change might 
lead to a small migration, which in turn might lead to yet another policy change and still 
more migration, until eventually a stable configuration has been located. One approach 
to capturing the extent of sorting is to keep track of the tot� number of agent reloca­
tions for each political institution. Table 3 shows that two-party competition, as well as 
Borda rule and proportional representation, results in significantly more relocations than 
democratic referenda with three, seven, and eleven jurisdictions. 
Table 3 
Number of Agent Relocations 
Institution 3 Loc's (s.d.) 7 Loc's (s.d) 1 1  Loc's (s.d.) 
Democratic Ref. 8 64. 16 (121.90) 8 63.2 (73.55) 88 7.3 (37.22) 
Two-party Comp. 915.68 (103.71) 1 162.5 (61.03) 1293.7 (50.43) 
Borda Rule ( 4 parties) 18 16. 18 (24 7.95) 2525.8 2  (272.8 0) 2753.2 (216.26) 
Prop. Rep. ( 4 parties) 1237.48 (191.52) 1623.6 (220.88 ) . 1762.8 (209.48 )
The findings in Table 3 agree with our proposed explanation. As an additional test 
of whether the utility differences stem from improved sorting, we measure the average 
Hamming distance between the LPDAs across jurisdictions. 23 To make the findings 
23We also measured the variance of agents' preferences in each j urisdiction and found an identical 
ranking of the institutions. Democratic referenda results in the most variance, followed by two-party 
competition, then proportional representation. Borda rule results in the least variance in preferences, 
which might be interpreted as the most homogeneous preferences at each j urisdiction. 
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more understandable, we normalize the Hamming distances, reporting the percentage of 
maximum possible Hamming distance. In this way, normalized Hamming distance lies 
between zero and one hundred, and with eleven LPis, if two LPDAs disagree on exactly 
3 issues then their normalized Hamming distance equals three-elevenths, or 28%. 
Table 4 
Normalized Hamming Distance Between LPDAs 
Institution 3 Loc's (s.d.) 7 Loc's (s.d) 1 1  Loc's (s.d) 
Democratic Ref. 61.58 (5.92) 51.64 (2.28) 50. 76 (1.65) 
Two-party Comp. 65.21 (2.89) 53.96 (1.64) 52.26 (0.90) 
Borda Rule ( 4 parties) 66. 18  (2.06) 56. 59 (0.80) 53.98 (0.49) 
Prop. Rep. ( 4 parties) 66.67 (2 .00) 56. 16 (0.99) 53.78 (0.53) 
In all but one case, Borda Rule results in the most heterogeneous LPDAs followed 
by proportional representation, two-party competition, and democratic referenda re­
spectively. This ranking agrees with the utility rankings and the number of relocation 
rankings. More relocations and greater LPDA heterogeneity imply better sorting and, 
therefore, higher aggregate utility. 
Average LPDA heterogeneity decreases as the number of jurisdictions increases. This 
was expected. Two LPDAs may have a heterogeneity equal to one, but there does not 
exist a triple of LPDAs such that all subsets of size two have heterogeneity equal to one, 
so the maximal possible average heterogeneity decreases. In general, as the number of 
jurisdictions increases, the LPDAs become more crowded in the space of possible LPDAs 
reducing their average heterogeneity. 
Much of our argument as to why the institutions involving party competition out­
perform democratic referenda hinges upon the assumption that outcomes from these 
institutions are less stable, i.e., the LPDAs often change when agents preferences have 
a high degree of heterogeneity. We now test whether this in fact occurs. To do so we 
create populations of agents of varying degrees of heterogeneity. We then measure the 
number of changes in LPDAs over time and verify whether the number of LPDA changes 
increases with the heterogeneity of preferences. 
To create populations of agents with specified levels of heterogeneity, each agent's ideal 
point was made a convex combination of a base preference and an individual preference. 
Both an agent's individual preference and the common base preference were drawn from 
the same distribution as agents' preferences in the basic model. We can write an agent's 
preferences as 
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(1 - 0) . base + e .  individual.
We refer to e as the degree of heterogeneity. In the findings shown, we examine 
a one jurisdiction model with two hundred and fifty agents. The restriction to one 
jurisdiction guarantees that none of the changes in LPDAs are attributable to the shifting 
population. We vary e between 0.5 and 1 .0. Values of e lower than this create agents 
whose preferences are too homogeneous: almost all have the same preferred platform. 
The findings presented below are from fifty series of ten elections. Flips equals the number 
of LPDs which changed in each election. 
Table 5 
Flips as a Function of Heterogeneity 
e Dem Ref Pro. Rep. Borda Two-Party 
0.50 0.00 (0.00) 0.69 (0.38) 0.81 (0.27) 0.24 (0. 15) 
0.55 0.00 (0.00) 0.80 (0.33) 0.90 (0.25) 0.21 (0. 16)
0.60 0.00 (0.00) 0.80 (0.37) 0.98 (0.29) 0.23 (0.24) 
0.65 0.00 (0.00) 0.77 (0.40) 1 .01 (0.29) 0.26 (0.24) 
0 .70 0.00 (0.00) 0.88 (0.48) 1 .03 (0.3 1) 0.31 (0.37)
0. 75 0.00 (0.00) 1.01 (0.53) 1. 13 (0.35) 0.38 (0.44) 
0.80 0.00 (0.00) 1 .26 (0.55) 1 . 13 (0.36) 0.53 (0.49) 
0.85 0.00 (0.00) 1.94 (0.69) 1.23 (0.45) 0.68 (0.73) 
0.90 0.00 (0.00) 2.84 (0. 71) 1.51 (0.51) 1.37 (1. 1 1) 
0.95 0.00 (0.00) 3. 78 (0.62) 2. 14 (0.68) 2.65 (1.08)
1 .00 0.00 (0.00) 4.02 (0.59) 2.48 (0. 76) 3.36 (1. 12) 
Democratic referenda shows no flips for all degrees of heterogeneity. This occurs be­
cause with a fixed population, democratic referenda results in a unique outcome, and in 
this scenario no agents move into or out of the jurisdiction. For the other three institu­
tions we find, as expected, that the average number of flips increases with the degree of 
heterogeneity. These findings strongly support our assumption that as preferences in a 
jurisdiction become more homogeneous the propensity for LPDAs to wander decreases. 
The final test required to substantiate our argument is whether annealing improves 
the performance of democratic referenda. To test annealing we introduce a probability 
with which agents chose to live in a suboptimal jurisdiction. We lower that probability 
over time to create an annealing effect. The average utility increased in almost every case. 
For example, in an eleven jurisdiction model, when the initial probability of moving to 
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a suboptimal jurisdiction was five percent and where this probability decreases by five 
percent each period for ten periods, aggregate utility increases from 55.35 to 55.61 ,  which 
is significant at a 95% level. These findings suggest that noise alone may be enough to 
improve outcomes. The findings above, which suggest that the error rate is correlated 
with the aggregate utility of the configurations, lend support to the notion that noise, or 
small mistakes, may be beneficial. 
5.4 Relocation Costs 
Relocation costs reduce the number of agent relocations, and as a result reduce the 
amount of sorting. The inclusion of relocation costs can affect the absolute and relative 
performance of the political institutions we consider. At the extreme, if relocation costs 
are so high that no agent would ever want to relocate, then a multiple jurisdiction model 
would be equivalent to multiple single jurisdiction models. Institutional performance 
in the one jurisdiction model and the multiple jurisdiction model would therefore be 
equivalent. The relevant question is whether small relocation costs have proportional 
effects or large effects. We find that that the effects are roughly proportional. Small 
increases in relocation costs have correspondingly small effects on the number of agent 
relocations and on the ability of agents to sort. 
Tables 6 and 7 presents findings from a seven jurisdiction model in which the cost 
of relocation equals one divided by the number of LPis, i\,  and in which the cost of
relocation equals two divided by the number of LPis, 1
2
1 , respectively.
Table 6 
Relocations Costs = 1/(nurnber of LPis) 
Institution Utility (s.d.) Reloc's (s.d.) LPDA Het. (s.d.) 
Democratic Ref. 47.54 (2.04) 762.90 ( 43.86) 50. 84 (2.36) 
Two-party Comp. 49. 13 (1.87) 1007.60 (54.40) 54. 10 (1.35) 
Borda Rule 51 .02 (1.68) 1828.20 (186.72) 56.23 (0.77) 
Prop. Rep. 50. 65 (1. 73) 1237.56 (131.97) 56.23 (0. 71) 
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Table 7 
Relocations Costs = 2 / (number of LP Is) 
Institution Utility (s.d.) Reloc's (s.d.) LPDA Het. (s.d.) 
Democratic Ref. 46.54 (1 .99) 681.88 (29.91) 51 .05 (2.37) 
Two-party Comp. 48.02 (2.03) 862.66 (48.15) 54. 13 (1.57) 
Borda Rule 49. 73 (1.97) 1358.38 (105.97) 55.97 (1. 10) 
Prop. Rep. 49.70 (1.87) 1031. 22 (91.68) 56.07 (0.97) 
The ranking of the institutions according to utility and number of movements is identi­
cal in the two cases. Moreover, the number of relocations and aggregate utility decreases. 
Differences in heterogeneity are insignificant. 
5.5 P robabilistic Replacement of Agents 
We now examine a model in which agents leave the global economy with a small probabil­
ity and are replaced by agents with randomly drawn preferences. In Table 8, we present 
findings from a seven jurisdiction model in which each agent is replaced with probability 
equal to 0.02. Rather than run the model for just ten iterations, we experimented with 
longer time horizons. The findings below are taken from a model with only forty reloca­
tions as we found that increases beyond forty or fifty did not appear to have significant 
effects. 
Table 8 
Probability of Replacing Agents = 0 .02 
Institution Utility (s.d.) Reloc's (s.d.) LPDA Het. (s.d.) 
Democratic Referenda 48.32 (1.56) 1332.0 (90.94) 52.7 1 (2. 16) 
Two-party Competition 48.82 (1.28) 1641. 7 (96.47) 54.39 (1.31) 
Borda Rule 51 .62 (1.38) 5321.0 (399. 1 1) 56.52 (0.66) 
Prop. Rep. 5 1. 1 1  (1.23) 2841.0 (348.40) 56. 73 (0.56) 
The relative rankings of the institutions are the same as in the seven jurisdiction model 
without replacement. In the probabilistic replacement scenario, the two multiple party 
institutions result in massive numbers of relocations relative to the other two institutions. 
Not unexpectedly, the aggregate utility and level of LPDA heterogeneity is much higher 
for these two institutions as well. 
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6 Discussion 
This paper makes the claim that in a model of Tiebout competition some institutions 
perform better than others in that they induce more sorting and generate on average 
higher aggregate utility. Ironically, these institutions often perform relatively poorly in 
a single jurisdiction model. The reason for this performance reversal is that the multiple 
location model is a complex environment with many possible stable configurations. A 
minor mistake, which is harmful in the single jurisdiction model, may be beneficial in 
the multiple location model in that it can dislodge the system off a relatively bad local 
optima. In our model of Tiebout competition, instability in policies causes people to 
leave jurisdictions they do not like and to join jurisdictions they do like. Occasional 
wrong moves by people can lead to an avalanche of moves by others, leading to better 
outcomes (better sorting) in the end. 
In the multiple jurisdiction model, aggregate utility, the number of relocations, and 
the heterogeneity of LPDAs were highly correlated. Institutions which generate high 
aggregate utility induce more relocations and result in more heterogeneous LPDAs. We 
also find that the number of policy flips increases with the degree of heterogeneity of 
preferences for the electoral institutions considered. Thus, <?UT findings agree with the 
· annealing argument put forth in section 4 as to why institutions which perform poorly
with only one jurisdiction might perform well with multiple jurisdictions. 
There are many strong assumptions in the current model. The parties lack policy 
preferences, and voters are not strategic. If we allow parties with policy preferences, then 
outcomes may even be less representative then under the current model. The relevant 
issue is whether the number of policy flips will be positively correlated with the degree of 
heterogeneity of preferences. We see no reason why this would not be the case. Strategic 
voting, on the other hand, may dampen this effect. With strategic voters, outcomes from 
Borda rule and proportional representation may become more representative, reducing 
the number of policy flips which occur when agents have heterogeneous preferences. 
The general picture that emerges from our work is quite intriguing. Tiebout mod­
els are just one example of a broad class of phenomena that must "sort" agents among 
alternative configurations (other examples include models of coalition formation and or­
ganization). Under decentralized sorting mechanisms, these systems can get trapped in 
suboptimal configurations. If, however, there are means by which these poor configura­
tions can be annealed in an appropriate manner, then the global system can escape these 
configurations and achieve superior outcomes. We find that certain political institutions 
act as natural annealing mechanisms, and this insight provides an important link for 
understanding the dynamical behavior and ultimate performance of such institutions. 
A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the American 
Political Science Association, New York City, 1994. A portion of this work was funded 
by NSF grants SBR 94-09602, SBR 94-1 1025 , and SBR 94- 10948 
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